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Development of Community
Property Law in Arizona
John D. Lyons*
If we date the community property system, in what is now
Arizona, from the arrival of the first Spanish explorers in 1539,
then it has existed there for 414 of the 415 ensuing years. The
excluded year is 1865, when the Howell Code in its original form
was in force.
This first code of the laws of Arizona was adopted by its
first territorial legislature, taking effect, for the most part, on the
first day of January, 1865.1 It takes no notice of community
property. On the contrary, it expressly repeals the laws of Mex-
ico, Spain, and the Territory of New Mexico, theretofore existing
in the territory,2 adopts the common law of England as the rule
of decision,3 establishes dower and curtesy,4 and provides that all
property acquired by a married woman, whether by "grant" or
"in any other manner" shall constitute her separate estate.5 By
an act of December 30, 1865,6 however, the second territorial
legislature repealed the two last-mentioned provisions and
adopted a comprehensive community property statute.7
It has been suggested that the first legislature did not intend
to abrogate the community property system, and that the later
legislation was merely confirmatory of its already continuing
existence." Certainly the haste in which the original Howell
Code was compiled and adopted,9 and the expedition with which
it was amended, support this view. Still, it is clear that the or-
ganizers of the territory, most of whom had recently arrived
* Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law.
1. HOWELL CODE C. LXI, § 12 (1864).
2. Id. c. LXI, § 1.
3. Id. c. LXI, § 7.
4. Id. c. XXVII.
5. Id. c. XXXII, § 1.
6. Effective January 29, 1866. Id. c. I, § 2.
7. Ariz. Laws 1865, p. 58 et seq.
8. See 1 DE FUNAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 4, n. 7 (1943).
9. It was compiled within six months after the organization of the terri-
tory. TERRITORY OF ARIzONA LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 63 (1864). And its sixty chap-
ters were adopted during a legislative session of forty-three days.
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from common law jurisdictions, were no admirers of the existing
laws.10 And since their code was partly patterned upon the code
of California," they had before them the community property
statutes of that state, had they wished to adopt them. Therefore,
it seems equally reasonable to speculate that the community
property statute of December 30, 1865, represented not the cor-
rection of an oversight, nor mere legislative confirmation of
existing law, but, rather, a real change of heart, following an
original intention to replace community property with a common
law system. And if, in the absence of any satisfactory evidence
of the true legislative intent, we apply the presumption that the
legislature meant what it said, we must conclude that community
property did not prevail in Arizona during 1865. This has been
the view of the Arizona court.12
Nevertheless, and even though Arizona be taken to have
"adopted," rather than "continued," the community system, its
Supreme Court has said that the Spanish law, so far as it is
consistent with the laws and customs of the state, may be applied
to its interpretation.' s The community property system is a
creature of statute, to be sure, but it is also sui generis, and it
is not governed by common law principles.
4
' In practice, however, these sound theories of interpretation
have been largely honored in the breach. Direct citation of
Spanish authority is almost unknown. The common law prefer-
ence for case precedents is indulged as freely here as in other
fields. And the system has undoubtedly been "molded to some
extent by . . .common-law rules."' 5
10. See letter from Gov. Goodwin, dated November 9, 1864: "The laws and
customs of Spain and Mexico had been clashing with the statute and common
law of the United States .... ." TERRITORY OF ARIZONA LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL
241-2 (1864); and letter of Judge Howell dated June 10, 1864: "[They] were
so ill adapted to our condition that a complete organization of the Territorial
Government could not be had until a code of laws was substituted for those
now in force." Id. at 63.
11. TERRITORY OF ARIZONA LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL 35 (1865).
12. See Stiles v. Lord, 2 Ariz. 154, 158, 11 Pac. 314, 315 (1886): "[The act
of December 30, 18651 must be held . . . to take the place of the act of 1864,
and to repeal it by implication. This law enacted for this territory the com-
munity system . . ."; Blackman v. Blackman, 45 Ariz. 374, 382, 43 P.2d 1011,
1014 (1935): "In the original Howell Code of 1864 the common-law rule of
marital property rights, somewhat liberalized, was adopted, but this rule was
in effect abolished and the community property system was established by
the act of December 30, 1865 .. "
13. Pendleton v. Brown, 25 Ariz. 604, 610, 221 Pac. 213, 216 (1923). The
statutory reception of the common law as the rule of decision has been
amended so that it now applies only when consistent with our "established
customs." HOWELL CODE c. LXI, § 7 (1864), as amended, Ariz. Laws 1907,
c. 10, § 8.
14. Blackman v. Blackman, 45 Ariz. 374, 386, 43 P.2d 1011, 1015 (1935).
15. La Tourette v. La Tourette, 15 Ariz. 200, 207, 137 Pac. 426, 428 (1914).
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This trend was manifested as early as 1876, in the first of
the Charauleau-Woffenden cases.16 The question in that case
was whether the rents and profits derived from separate prop-
perty were, themselves, separate or common. The act of Decem-
ber 30, 1865, said they were common. 7 This was also the Spanish
law,' and coincided beautifully with its basic concept that since
both spouses were primarily concerned with advancing the
interests of the marital community, both would naturally wish
to dedicate all of their acquests during coverture to that pur-
pose.19 But to the common-law-trained judges of the territorial
court, the two ideas, that property could be the separate property
of the wife, and that, at the same time, its fruits could be com-
mon, and, therefore, subject to the husband's control, seemed
"antagonistic," and equivalent to "confiscation." It quoted with
approval from a California decision:
"The common law [sic] recognized no such solecism ....
It would be to make the wife the trustee for the husband,
holding the legal title, while he held the fruits of that title."'2
On these common law grounds the court concluded that this
provision of the community property statutes had been impliedly
repealed by the Married Women's Property Act of 1871.21
This decision was followed in the second Charauleau-
Woffenden case.22 It was expressly overruled by the third.23
At the end of ten years, in the fourth of these cases, the court
returned to its original position, commenting that "It is time this
vexed question were laid to rest."24 How easily and how much
better, that might have been done in the beginning, by referring
to the applicable Spanish authorities! The Spanish rule, in this
respect, could hardly be called inconsistent with our customs
since it prevails in several states.25 But instead of resorting to
16. Charauleau v. Woffenden, 1 Ariz. 243, 25 Pac. 652 (1876).
17. Ariz. Laws 1865, c. XXXI, § 9, p. 61.
18. 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 180 (1943).
19. "Just as the salary of the husband contributes to defraying the ex-
penses of matrimony, the interests and fruits borne by the property of each
spouse are dedicated to the same purpose." 22 SCAEVOLA, C05DIGO CIvIL 247
(1905), as quoted in De La Torre v. National City Bank of New York, 110
F.2d 976, 979, n. 2 (1st Cir. 1940).
20. Charauleau v. Woffenden, 1 Ariz. 243, 260, 25 Pac. 652, 657 (1876),
quoting from George v. Ransom, 15 Cal. 322, 324 (1860).
21. Ariz. Laws 1871, p. 18.
22. Woffenden v. Charauleau, 1 Ariz. 346, 25 Pac. 662 (1876).
23. Woffenden v. Charouleau (sic), 2 Ariz. 44, 8 Pac. 302 (1885).
24. Woffenden v. Charouleau (sic), 2 Ariz. 91, 93, 11 Pac. 117, 118 (1886).
The rule had in the meantime been adopted by statute. Ariz. Laws 1885,
No. 5, p. 5, now ARuz. CODE ANN. § 63-302 (1939).
25. 1 DID FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 181 (1943).
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these basic sources the court struggled until the last to adapt the
alien rules of the English common law to the community concept
of marital property.
Such deviations from the classic community pattern tend to
multiply by spontaneous generation. For example, once we
have ruled that the fruits of separate property are separate we
face a problem in the business whose profits are attributable in
part to invested separate capital, and in part to the personal
labor, skill, or management of a spouse. Under original com-
munity principles all of such profits would be community prop-
erty. But the Arizona court, to be consistent, has had to rule
that in such case the profits are separate to the extent that they
are attributable to the separate capital, and community to the
extent that they are attributable to the personal services of a
spouse.26
This result is logical enough. It even bears a superficial
resemblance to the sound community property doctrine that
property purchased in part with community and in part with
separate funds shall be deemed separate and community in the
same proportions as the purchase price. But in practice it is
wholly incapable of definite and certain application. For by what
standard shall we determine what part of the profit is attribu-
table to capital and what to personal services? Shall we allow
legal interest on the investment and rule that the rest of the
profit is community? Or shall we, on the other hand, allow the
participating spouse a reasonable salary for his personal services
and deem the rest to be the separate product of separate capital?
Arizona has avoided both of these extremes in favor of the ad
hoc approach to individual cases. Doubtless this is the fairest
rule. But the standard of decision is so indefinite that one can
seldom predict the result before the court has spoken. This illus-
trates rather graphically the secondary, generally unforeseen,.
and sometimes unfortunate, consequences which may follow an
original deviation from a time-tried and integrated body of law.
In the application of common law rules to community prop-
erty problems these early Arizona cases set a pattern which has
persisted until the present. This was no doubt inevitable in a
state where the law is administered by common law lawyers.
And it must be conceded that since the "vexed" territorial courts
26. Barr v. Petzhold, 273 P.2d 161 (Ariz. 1954); In re Torrey's Estate, 54
Ariz. 369, 95 P.2d 990 (1939); Rundle v. Winters, 38 Ariz. 239, 298 Pac. 929
(1931).
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have done the spade work in accommodating common law rules
to this unaccustomed purpose, and as local precedents have
multiplied, the resultant system has not worked too badly. Yet,
Arizona lawyers can afford to remember that reliance upon
Spanish authorities in community property cases is not a mere
eccentricity. It can aid, upon occasion, in the sound resolution
of basic problems, and is unobjectionable in either reason or
authority.
Of course, the tendency to apply common law rules to com-
munity property cases is not peculiar to Arizona. Most, if not
all, of the community states have evinced it to a considerable
extent. And, together with frequent statutory amendments, it
has resulted in some diversity in the details of the system
amongst the states. We should not, however, overemphasize the
importance of this diversity, for the common overriding fact of
the existence of the conjugal partnership far outweighs these
minor variances in its operation.
Arizona's first community property statute was apparently
derived from California.27 But, as the statutes of these states
were amended and construed, their law grew apart, and in
recent years the Arizona court has repeatedly said that its con-
cept most closely resembles that of Washington.28
The foundation of the Arizona concept of community prop-
erty is "equal rights, '29 as laid down in the leading case of La
Tourette v. La Tourette: 30
"The law makes no distinction between the husband and
wife in respect to the right each has in the community prop-
erty. It gives the husband no higher or better title than it
gives the wife. It recognizes a marital community wherein
27. See Dunne, C. J., dissenting in Woffenden v. Charauleau, 1 Ariz. 346,
357, 25 Pac. 662, 665 (1876); Kirkwood, HistoricaZ Background and Objectives
of the Law of Community Property in the Pacific Coast States, 11 WASH.
L. REV. 1, 5 (1936).
28. See, e.g., Cosper v. The Valley Bank, 28 Ariz. 373, 237 Pac. 175 (1925),
in which the statement originated; Porter v. Porter, 67 Ariz. 273, 195 P.2d
132 (1948); Maricopa County v. Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35, 208 P.2d 646 (1949). After
thirty years and important changes in the law of other states this frequently
quoted observation might profitably be re-examined.
29. The term "entity theory," sometimes used particularly in connection
with the similar Washington law, is unnecessarily misleading to common
lawyers. The community is not a "legal entity" in their sense. And for the
description of an "entity theory" Puerto Rico style, see De La Torre v. Na-
tional City Bank of New York, 110 F.2d 976, 978 (1st Cir. 1940): "[Als
regards third parties, the [community] and the husband constitute a single
entity .. "
30. 15 Ariz. 200, 205, 137 Pac. 426, 428 (1914).
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both are equal. Its policy plainly expressed is to give the
wife in this marital community an equal dignity, and make
her an equal factor in the matrimonial gains .... It recog-
nizes that the wife in her station is as much an agency in
the acquisition as the husband, and is entitled to just as great
an interest."
It follows that the wife's interest in the community property
during coverture has never been regarded as inchoate, or a mere
expectancy, but has always been recognized as a presently
vested interest. The former disagreement over the nature of her
interest, which "fed the flame of juridical controversy for many
years,"31 seems to have been finally resolved, in all of the com-
munity property states, in favor of a vested interest, partly from
practical considerations originating with the federal income tax
laws. But the Arizona emphasis on "equal rights" led inevitably
to this conclusion from the beginning,32 so that there has never
been any other rule in that state.
It is highly significant that the early development of com-
munity property law in Arizona coincided with the nineteenth
century trend toward the legal emancipation of women, which
culminated in the Married Women's Property Acts. The sturdy
chivalry (so insistent as to suggest a bad conscience) which
characterized much judicial writing of this period is evident in
the first two Charauleau-Woffenden cases.38 It certainly had as
much to do with the final result of those cases as the common
law rules and community misconceptions on which it was osten-
sibly based. In a new jurisdiction, "whose institutions had not
yet crystallized into form under archaic ideas of the subjection
of the female sex,"' 4 the spirit of the times could be freely in-
dulged. This spirit, rather than any conscious reliance upon
civil law concepts, seems to explain the emphasis upon "equal
rights" and the wife's "vested interest." And as to several other
questions, which were controversial during the early develop-
ment of American community property in the west, it deter-
mined the course which Arizona was to follow.
The measure was equal rights, not merely equal title. To
31. Mr. Justice Holmes, in Arnett v. Reade, 220 U.S. 311, 319 (1911).
32. La Tourette v. La Tourette, 15 Ariz. 200, 208, 137 Pac. 426, 429 (1914);
Goodell v. Koch, 282 U.S. 118 (1930).
33. Charauleau v. Woffenden, 1 Ariz. 243, 25 Pac. 652 (1876); Woffenden
v. Charauleau, 1 Ariz. 346, 25 Pac. 662 (1876).
34. See Cosper v. The Valley Bank, 28 Ariz. 373, 376, 237 Pac. 175, 176
(1925).
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early Arizona lawyers and lawmakers (and to their wives) the
nice civil law distinction between habere, signifying ownership,
and tenere, signifying the right to manage or administer, seemed
as empty as it does to a modern Spanish feminist. Of how much
satisfaction was it to an emancipated wife to possess equal title
to the common property, if the power of disposition, so long, at
least, as it was exercised for the "benefit" of the community,
resided exclusively in the husband? This was in some respects
less than the common law dower right, which could be released
only with the wife's consent.
The first Arizona statute gave the husband "the entire man-
agement and control of the common property, with the like
absolute power of disposition as to his own separate estate ...."
(Italics supplied.)3 5 This language, which seems to go even
beyond the civil law, was broad enough to allow the husband to
give away or waste the community property, since he could
have done so with his separate estate; particularly since the
same chapter gives the wife a specific remedy for mismanage-
ment or waste of "her separate property. '3 6 As later modified
the statute provided merely that the common property might
"be disposed of by the husband only. '3 7 And by a 1901 amend-
ment the wife's joinder was required in "all deeds and mortgages
affecting [community] real estate, except unpatented mining
claims."3s
The husband's sole agency to dispose of the community
property had rested upon the wife's presumed incompetence in
business matters. It was as this presumption came to be re-
garded as less valid that his exclusive agency was withdrawn as
to the relatively infrequent conveyance and encumbrance of
real estate. For practical reasons it has been retained as to
personal property.3 9 But the court has been at pains to point
out that:
"The law, in giving this power to the husband during
coverture to dispose of the personal property, does not do
this in recognition of any higher or superior right that he
has therein, but because the law considers it expedient and
35. Ariz. Laws 1865, c. XXXI, § 9, p. 61.
36. Ariz. Laws 1865, c. XXXI, § 8, p. 60.
37. ARIZ. REv. STAT. 1 2102 (1887).
38. ARIZ. REV. STAT. 1 3104 (1901). This is still the law. ARIZ. CODE ANN.
§ 71-409 (1939).
39. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 63-301 (1939).
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necessary in business transactions affecting the personalty
to have an agent of the community with power to act."4
The next logical step is to make both the husband and the wife,
like true partners, agents for the community in the disposition
of its personalty. It remains to be seen whether female emanci-
pation and legislative chivalry will go this far. At present the
law deems the husband "best qualified for [this] purpose. '41
As to the disposition of the wife's separate estate the Arizona
statutes underwent a similar but more rapid evolution. They at
first provided, contrary to the Spanish law,42 that "the husband
shall have the management and control of the separate property
of the wife during the continuance of the marriage," although
the wife was required to join in its sale or encumbrance. 43 But
ever since the Married Women's Property Act of 1871, 4 4 married
women of the age of twenty-one years, or upwards, have had
the sole control and management of their separate property, as
if unmarried. 45
Another question which had to be settled was that of the
liability of the separate and common property of the spouses for
their separate debts. That the separate property of each was
liable for the separate debts of its owner seems never to have
been doubted. 40 And that the husband's separate property could
not be charged with the antenuptial debts of the wife was pro-
vided in the first community property statute.4 7 This exemption
was soon applied mutually: "The separate property of the hus-
band or wife shall not be liable for the debts of the other
contracted before marriage. '48 That the same rule should apply
to postnuptial separate debts appears logical,49 and is generally
assumed, although an argument to the contrary may be based
on the maxim expressio unius.5
40. La Tourette v. La Tourette, 15 Ariz. 200, 206, 137 Pac. 426, 428 (1914).
41. Ibid.
42. 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 316 et seq. (1943).
43. Ariz. Laws 1865, c. XXXI, § 6, p. 60. There were some other excep-
tions, e.g., when the husband did not reside In the territory.
44. Ariz. Laws 1871, p. 18.
45. ARIZ. CODE ANN. §§ 63-303, 71-409 (1939); Stiles v. Lord, 2 Ariz. 154,
11 Pac. 314 (1886); Miller v. Fisher, 1 Ariz. 232, 25 Pac. 651 (1875).
46. As to the wife's antenuptial debts this was specifically stated In the
first community property statute, Ariz. Laws 1865, c. XXXI, § 13, p. 61.
47. Ibid.
48. ARIZ. REV. STAT. I1 2105 (1887); ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 63-304 (1939).
49. Bee 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 452 (1943).
50. The grounds for rejection of the maxim in Forsythe v. Paschal, 34
Ariz. 380, 271 Pac. 865 (1928) are inapplicable to this situation.
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Touching the more important problem of the liability of the
common property for separate debts (generally the husband's)
the Arizona rule is contrary to that of most community property
states. The statute says only that "The community property of
the husband and wife shall be liable for the community debts
contracted by the husband during marriage .... -51 Since only
the husband can make contracts binding the common property,52
and since there can be no such thing as a community debt con-
tracted before the marriage or after its dissolution, this statute
includes all community debts. But it is silent as to the com-
munity's liability for separate debts.
The first case involving this question was Villescas v. The
Arizona Copper Co.53 In a rather cursory opinion the court held
the community chargeable with a criminal fine incurred by the
husband quite apart from the community affairs. The court cites
some authorities from other states, but seems to be chiefly in-
fluenced by the conviction that any other rule would be unfair
to creditors, who must be protected from what it calls "secret
contracts and agreements of the highly confidential relation of
the spouses." Presumably this refers to agreements between
husband and wife whereby separate property may be transmuted
into community. Nothing is said about the unfairness to the
marital partnership of having its assets applied to pay debts
which are in no way connected with its affairs.
Later, in Cosper v. The Valley Bank,54 involving an obliga-
tion which was held to be, in fact, a community debt, the court
went out of its way to disapprove the holding in the Villescas
case, and in a well-reasoned discussion to express the opinion
that the common property is not chargeable with the separate
debts of the spouses. This is now the settled rule in Arizona,55
although, upon the dissolution of the community, separate debts
are chargeable to the debtor's one-half.5
51. ARIZ. REV. STAT. 1 2106 (1887); ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 64-304 (1939).
52. ARIZ. REV. STAT. 2104 (1887); ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 63-303 (1939). An
exception is the wife's right to contract debts for necessaries for herself and
children. But even these are contracted upon the credit of the husband.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. 1 2107, 2108 (1887); ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 63-305 (1939).,
53. 20 Ariz. 268, 179 Pac. 963 (1919).
54. 28 Ariz. 373, 237 Pac. 175 (1925).
55. Barr v. Petzhold, 273 P.2d 161 (Ariz. 1954); Tway v. Payne, 55 Ariz.
343, 101 P.2d 455 (1940); McFadden v. Watson, 51 Ariz. 110, 74 P.2d 1181
(1938); Payne v. Williams, 47 Ariz. 396, 56 P.2d 186 (1936); Perkins v. First
Nat. Bk. of Holbrook, 47 Ariz. 376, 56 P.2d 639 (1936); Jackson v. Griffin, 39
Ariz. 183, 4 P.2d 900-(1931); Forsythe v. Paschal, 34 Ariz. 380, 271 Pac. 865
(1928).
56. Tway v. Payne, 55 Ariz. 343, 101 P.2d 455 (1940); Jackson v. Griffin,
39 Ariz. 183, 4 P.2d 900 (1931).
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In the Cosper case the court reasons that this result flows
inevitably from what was, even then, the Arizona concept of
each spouse's equal, undivided and vested interest in the com-
munity property. To charge the common- property for an in-
dividual debt would be to make one's property liable for the
debts of another. It holds, too, that the statutory subjection of
the community property to community debts is to be construed
as exclusive, and as stating "for what debts community property
shall be liable. 57
The result is good Spanish community property law. But
to what extent, if at all, it is consciously based upon that au-
thority, either directly or indirectly, is impossible to state. Its
immediate reliance is upon La Tourette v. La Tourette.58 And
the reflections in that case "upon the nature and character of
this estate known as community property," so far as they con-
cern the nature of the wife's present interest, were presented
without specific reference to authority.
Once again, however, it is perfectly clear that the court, in
the Cosper case, was greatly influenced by the modern view of
women's rights, and the fact that the separate debt there in-
volved was, as is usual, the husband's.
"Development of the community property law of the
western states has gone hand in hand with the general
emancipation of women from the economic bonds which
have so long burdened them. While under the common law
the husband and wife were 'one,' and he was always the
'one,' the world has of recent years gone a long way toward
recognizing that even a married woman was a human be-
ing, with most of the rights of such . . .59
The principle that community property is not answerable
for the husband's separate debts has given rise to some modern
problems not present in those community property states which
hold to a contrary view. In Oglesby v. Poage,60 for example, the
court was concerned with a constitutional tax exemption for
the property of military veterans. The particular case had to
do with the taxability of certain real estate, the community
property of a veteran husband and his non-veteran wife. While
recognizing that the wife's tax liability is her separate obliga-
57. Cosper v. The Valley Bank, 28 Ariz. 373, 382, 237 Pac. 175, 178 (1925).
58. 15 Ariz. 200, 137 Pac. 426 (1914).
59. 28 Ariz. 373, 375, 237 Pac. 175, 176 (1925).
60. 45 Ariz. 23, 40 P.2d 90 (1935).
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tion, the court concluded that the rule against the collection of
separate debts out of community property is a legislative policy
which must yield to the constitutional exemption of the vet-
eran's property only. The wife's property must, therefore, pay
its share of taxes, regardless of the fact that the enforcement of
the payment would result in a sale of her interest. This en-
forcement procedure is possible because the interests of the
spouses "are separate for the purpose of taxation," citing the
authority to file separate returns of community income taxes.
Then, there is the problem of the divorced man who re-
marries. Is the property of the second community chargeable
with the alimony and child support decreed to the wife and
children of the first? It is his separate obligation. To charge it
to the community is contrary to the rule, and unfair, by com-
munity property standards, to the wife and children of the
second marriage. Yet, to exempt the community property may
put him beyond the reach of his legal and moral obligations. This
question has not been decided by the Arizona Supreme Court at
this writing, and the trial courts of the state have reached con-
flicting conclusions.
Some of the trial courts have followed, and others have re-
fused to follow, the Washington rule. In Washington, as in
Arizona, community property is not liable for the husband's
separate debts. But in Fisch v. Marler,61 the Supreme Court of
Washington held that the husband's earnings could be garnished
for accrued installments of alimony due to his former wife. The
claim of the divorced wife upon the earnings of her former hus-
band is said to be a "fixed and prior" one. Her claim is not in
all cases to be enforced to the point of exhaustion of such earn-
ings, for the present wife also has a claim thereon. Therefore,
the court may exercise its discretion in allocating the husband's
earnings according to the necessities of the parties.
This decision could not be followed in Arizona without do-
ing violence to community property principles which have been
thoroughly settled in that state for many years. It is, in effect,
a common law decision, for it treats the husband's earnings as
his own. But it is a basic principle of Arizona community prop-
erty law that no distinction in the character of the common
property can be based upon its source as between the spouses.
Each has an equal, present and existing interest therein, whether
61. 1 Wash.2d 698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939).
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it originates entirely from the earnings of the husband, entirely
from the earnings of the wife, or partly from each. 2 In Payne
v. Williams,6 3 for example, it was held that the husband's salary
could not be garnished for his separate debt. This is so basic to
the community property concept that to deny it is to strike at
the roots of the system.
Some indication of the thinking of the Washington court is
contained in the case of Stafford v. Stafford,6 4 in which it refused
to apply the rule of Fisch v. Marler to community real estate.
In distinguishing the latter case the court says: "The husband
has much broader control over community personal property
than he has over community real estate." 65 But it is emphasized
in the Arizona case of La Tourette v. La Tourette,6 6 that this
power of control is only as agent for the community and not in
recognition of any higher right or title. Despite the husband's
broader control over it, community personal property is as much
community property, and the wife's vested interest therein is as
genuine, as in the case of community real estate.
The Washington court has pointed out that alimony and
support money payments are not a debt in the ordinary sense,
as, for example, within the meaning of the exemption statutes.
67
That is true. They are public obligations. But for our present
purposes this appears to be a distinction without a difference.
There would seem to be no principle of community property law
under which community property, as such, is free from liability
for separate ordinary debts, yet answerable for separate public
obligations. Certainly no such principle prevails in Arizona
where the community has been held not answerable for a sep-
arate criminal penalty assessed against the husband, 8 nor upon
the wife's separate statutory obligation to support her aged
mother.6 9
Yet this distinction between separate debts contracted by
the spouse and his separate obligations which are imposed by
62. ARIZ. CODE ANN. § 63-301 (1939). See also 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 166-68 (1943).
63. 47 Ariz. 396, 56 P.2d 186 (1936).
64. 10 Wash.2d 649, 117 P.2d 753 (1941).
65. Ibid., 117 P.2d at 754.
66. 15 Ariz. 200, 206, 137 Pac. 426, 428 (1914).
67. Fisch v. Marler, 1 Wash.2d 698, 715, 97 P.2d 147, 154 (1939); Stafford
v. Stafford, 18 Wash.2d 775, 788, 140 P.2d 545, 551 (1943).
68. Cosper v. The Valley Bank, 28 Ariz. 373, 237 Pac. 175 (1925), over-
ruling Villescas v. Arizona Copper Co., 20 Ariz. 268, 179 Pac. 963 (1919).
69. Maricopa County v. Douglas, 69 Ariz. 35, 208 P.2d 646 (1949).
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law does suggest a solution to the problem which is fair and
equitable for the wife and children of the first marriage, and
avoids the emasculation of the community property principle.
Under the Spanish law of community property, according to
de Funiak,
"It is undoubted . . .that where a spouse having a duty or
obligation imposed by law had insufficient separate funds
at the moment to meet such duty or obligation, it might be
met from the spouse's share in the community property,
provided that the other spouse suffered no detriment there-
from and that expenditures by one spouse from the com-
mon fund were properly charged against that spouse's share
.... In the case of the ordinary separate creditor, his rights
to reach his debtor's properties were subordinated to the
well-being and interests of the family which required that
the community property be kept intact for its benefit dur-
.ing the marriage. But obligations imposed by the state it-
self took priority over everything else. ' 70 (Italics supplied.)
This is quite different from holding the community property,
as such, answerable for these obligations. And it avoids the
community heresy of treating the husband's earnings as his own,
as at common law. It is simply to say that for the collection of
public obligations the community may be treated as divisible.
The rule is derived from basic community property sources and
is consistent with our laws and customs. As to the separate tax
liability of a spouse, this solution has already been adopted, in
principle, by the Arizona Supreme Court, in Oglesby v. Poage.71
And it seems to offer the soundest solution, under Arizona law,
for the enforcement of the remarried man's obligations to the
wife and children of a former marriage.
Summary
The most important influence in shaping the development of
community property law in Arizona has been, of course, the
community property system of Spain and Mexico. It was the
law of the region for more than three hundred years, and in broad
outline it is still the law of Arizona.
The common law, also, has exercised an influence. That was,
perhaps, inevitable, because of the common law training of the
Arizona bench and bar, and because of the former inaccessibility
70. 1 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY 468-69 (1943).
71. 45 Ariz. 23, 40 P.2d 90 (1935).
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of community property materials. But it is a dangerous influence.
The concepts are fundamentally divergent, and their mixing can
lead to unfortunate results.
Finally, there has been the influence of the nationwide trend
toward the legal emancipation of married women. This move-
ment has coincided, in point of time, with the history of the
territory and state of Arizona. It seems to explain the charac-
teristic Arizona doctrine of equal rights, which includes the
Spanish doctrine of equal title, and adds a large share of man-
agement and control in the wife. The result is a system which,
from the woman's point of view, must be the most satisfactory
since the days of the Amazons.
